In 1906, James McKeen Cattell, editor of Science, published a directory on men of science.
Introduction
Measuring science has become an "industry". Governments and their statistical offices have conducted regular surveys of resources devoted to research and development (R&D) since the 1950s. The methodology used is that suggested and conventionalized by the OECD Frascati manual, adopted by member countries in 1962, and now in its sixth edition.
1 Since the 1990s, national governments have also conducted regular surveys on innovation, again based on an OECD methodology known as the Oslo manual. Academics are also producers of their own statistics. Using scientific paper counts as a tool, sociologists and others have studied the "productivity" of scientists since the early 1900s. 5 Today, a whole community of researchers concerned with counting papers and citations called themselves bibliometricians.
When, how and why did science come to be measured in the first place? This paper documents the emergence of statistics on science and the very first uses to which they of 180 eminent men of science. It was after studying Galton's works that Cattell launched his directory.
The thesis of this paper is that the measurement of science emerged out of interest in great men, heredity and eugenics, and the contribution of eminent men to civilization.
Among these eminent men were men of science, the population of whom was thought to be in decline and insufficiently appreciated and supported. Statistics thus came to be collected to document the case, and to contribute to the advancement of science -and of the scientific profession. The statistics conceived were concerned with measuring the size of the scientific community, or men of science, and its conditions.
Several authors have documented the efforts of scientists toward the institutionalization of science in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In looking at organizations specifically dedicated to the advancement of science, for example, they have analyzed the different strategies and resources used by scientists and the forms that institutionalization took. 11 This paper is devoted to analyzing a poorly-studied resource, namely the collection of statistics. The period covered is from 1865, the year Galton published his first statistics on men of science, to circa 1944, the year of Cattell's death. The first part of the paper discusses where Cattell's idea of measuring men of science comes from. It looks at Galton's studies on eminent men, particularly Galton's writing on men of science, from the point of view of statistics on science. It documents the main elements of this work, which would later influence Cattell's studies and statistics. The second part turns to Cattell as an advocate for science with statistics as his tool, and how he adapted Galton's ideas on great men, heredity and eugenics to support the cause of the advancement of science. It focuses on Cattell's use of two concepts, one that measured quantity (productivity), and the other quality (performance). The third part analyzes how the intellectual and socioeconomic context, as well as Cattell's personal background, 11 S. G. Kohlstedt (1976) Science, 1831 Science, -1981 contributed to the emergence of statistics on science, and the impact of these two factors on the specifics of the statistics produced.
English Men of Science
Galton's measurements of science were based on his belief that the progress of civilization rests on great men, whose numbers were in decline. This idea was much in vogue in nineteenth-century England, when Francis Galton got interested in heredity.
12
Echoing these views, Galton suggested in 1869: "the qualities needed in civilized society are, speaking generally, such as will enable a race to supply a large contingent to the various groups of eminent men". 13 To Galton, however, there were only 233 eminent
British men for every one million population, while "if we could raise the average standard of our race one grade" there would be 2,423 of them. 14 Similarly, for higher degrees of "intelligence": "All England contains only six men between the age of thirty and eighty, whose natural gifts exceed class G; but in a country of the same population as ours, whose average was one grade higher, there would be eighty-two of such men; and in another whose average was two grades higher no less than 1,355 of them would be found". 15 Briefly stated, fertility, or what Galton called the productiveness of eminent families, was, in his opinion, too low.
When Galton started working on differences in intellectual ability and the role of heredity in the 1860s, he needed, first and foremost, a precise definition and a measure of "intelligence". This was a task every statistician before him had declined, including Quetelet. 16 To this end, Galton elected to pursue the notion of genius. Hereditary Genius, published in 1869, had in fact two purposes, measuring intellectual ability in a population, and documenting the role of heredity in the transmission of intellectual ability, most of the existing literature having looked mainly at the second goal. For this paper, the first purpose is as important as the second.
Words Used for Men of Intelligence and Reputation in Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century Literature

Genius Great
Eminent Successful
Famous Noteworthy
Illustrious Superior
Noted Distinguished
Celebrated Prominent
Gifted Notable
Hereditary Genius first developed a measurement of the distribution of intellectual ability within the British population as a whole. Galton began by estimating, based on evidence he did not provide, that there had been no more than about 400 geniuses in world history.
But how many eminent men are living now? To answer the question, Galton constructed a scale of ability based on the assumption that intellectual ability is distributed according to the law of error (or normal distribution). The top of the scale had three grades:
extraordinary genius (world history), highly eminent (living), and illustrious (living). To estimate the number in each of the classes, Galton looked at the 2,500 names mentioned in the British biographical handbook Men of the Time, published in 1865. He confined his analysis to those men who were over 50 years of age (850) because a "man must outlive the age of fifty to be sure of being widely appreciated". 17 This definition allowed him to exclude notoriety for a single act, and to focus on men who maintain their position over time. He estimated that 500 of them were decidedly well-known to persons familiar with literary and scientific society, saying of his typical study subject "he has distinguished himself pretty frequently either by purely original work, or as a leader of opinion".
18
Galton then divided his estimates by the British population over 50 years old (2 million), and arrived at the following distribution of ability, which followed Quetelet's law of error: "the deviations from the average -upward towards genius, and downward towards stupidity -(…) follow the law that governs deviations from all true averages": disposition, which urge and qualify a man to perform acts that lead to reputation".
24
Ability and reputation were to Galton the same thing; the latter was an indicator of the former: "Few have won high reputations without possessing these peculiar gifts. It follows that men who achieve eminence, and those who are naturally capable, are, to a large extent, identical".
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Having defined genius, Galton turned to the transmission of heredity, his second and main task. To this end, he looked at family histories of judges, statesmen, commanders, literary men, men of science, poets, musicians, painters, and divines. He chose 300 families containing nearly 1,000 eminent men (977), of whom 415 were illustrious. The source of his data was biographical dictionaries: "the lists were drawn without any bias of my own, for I always relied mainly upon the judgments of others, exercised without any knowledge of the object of the present inquiry, such as the selections made by historians or critics".
26
From the analysis of the data, Galton derived his law of heredity or distribution of ability among kinsmen, according to which "the nephew of an eminent man has far less chance of becoming eminent than a son, and that a more remote kinsman has far less chance than a nephew". 27 Galton calculated that the chances of kinsmen of illustrious men rising or having risen to eminence is, on average, 1 out of 6. Regarding men of science specifically, he found that one-half have one or more eminent relations: "to every 10 illustrious men, who have any eminent relations at all, we find 3 or 4 eminent fathers, 4
or 5 eminent brothers, and 5 or 6 eminent sons". 28 Men of science were thus exceptionally productive of eminent sons, and this Galton attributed to family environment (as opposed to heredity for other professional groups). Two results deserve mention here. First, the answers of respondents on the origins of their taste for science (motives) served as an indicator of heredity. The analysis showed that 59 of the men of science said that their taste for science was innate (Table 1) : "6 out of every 10 men of science were gifted by nature with a strong taste for it", observed
Galton; "certainly not 1 person in 10, taken at haphazard, possesses such an instinct; therefore I contend that its presence adds five-fold at least, to the chance of scientific success". 30 "A strong and innate taste for science is a prevailing characteristic among scientific men", 31 concluded Galton, based on faith in (and the memories of) his respondents, and ignoring the fact that one-third cited having been encouraged at home (environment), mainly by their fathers. Second, the analysis of antecedents revealed that men of science had less children than their parents: their living children between ages 5 and 50 was on average 4.7, as opposed to 6.3 for the families these men of science came from. To Galton, the numbers revealed a clear "tendency to an extinction of the families of men who work hard with the brain", 33 "a danger to the continuance of the race".
34 32 The analysis Galton made of educational profiles also contradicted his thesis on heredity: "My returns show me that men of science are not made by much teaching, but rather by awakening their interests, encouraging their pursuits when at home, and leaving them to teach themselves continuously throughout life" (p. 257 remunerative than any other pursuit". 43 To Galton, "the possession of a strong special taste [for science] is a precious capital, and that it is a wicked waste of national power to thwart it ruthlessly by a false system of education". 44 Such tastes "are as much articles of national wealth as coal and iron".
45
To sum up, Galton's work on men of science was characterized by four elements. First was his choice of this group of men because they were part of a larger group of eminent and began studying individual differences and mental testing, two terms he coined. 47 In 1889 A few years after having acquired the journal, Cattell's research on mental testing became fruitless. Cattell had initiated a large-scale program testing Columbia students every year, similar to Galton's experiment in museums and public expositions. In the end, however, it appeared that he was measuring psychological behaviour (like alertness) rather than mental abilities, and he was criticized for this. 49 Cattell partly redirected his efforts away from experimental psychology. Besides editing Science and the Popular Scientific Monthly (the latter until 1915, when he founded the Scientific Monthly), 50 Cattell turned to another kind of statistical analysis than experimental psychology: the "scientific" study of science. To Cattell, applying statistics to study men of intelligence, above all men of science, was highly desirable: "the accounts of great men in biographies and histories belong to literature rather than to science (…). It is now time that great men should be studied (…) by the methods of exact and statistical science". 51 There was a specific motive behind such studies, a motive learned from Galton. In an early study on eminent men, Cattell explained: "Are great men, as Carlyle maintains, divinely inspired leaders, or are they, as Spencer tells us, necessary products of given physical and social conditions? (…). We can only answer such questions by an actual study of facts". As a first step in this program, Cattell selected 1,000 men from six biographical dictionaries or encyclopedias (two English, two French, one German and one American)
to study the racial distribution of eminence among nations. 54 The sample population was composed of those names that appeared in the lists of at least three of the dictionaries, and that were allotted the greatest space on average, a method soon to be called historiometry. 55 The statistics showed that only a few nations produce eminence: "France leads, followed pretty closely by Great Britain. Then there is a considerable fall to Germany and Italy". 56 To Cattell, the moral was clear: "The progress to our present civilization may have depended largely on the comparatively few men who have guided it, and the civilization we hope to have may depend on a few men (…). If we can improve the stock by eliminating the unfit or by favoring the endowed -if we give to those who have and take away from those who have not even that which they have -we can greatly accelerate and direct the course of evolution. If the total population, especially of the well endowed, is larger, we increase the number of great men". "there is, however, no other criterion of a man's work than the estimation in which it is held by those most competent to judge". 59 The results showed that "the differences are not continuous, but there is a tendency towards the formation of groups or species". How did Cattell explain such a "poor" record? He observed that the 200 psychologists came from 76 institutions (colleges), but studied at a small number of universities. This sufficed for him to draw the following conclusion: "psychologists are born, not made.
After the men have graduated from college, and when their work has been chosen, they are gathered for their special studies into a few universities. It does not seem, however, that they are turned into psychologists at these universities. They simply select for study the universities that have reputation and facilities, being often attracted by fellowships or the hope that the university will assist them in securing positions". 65 To Cattell, the moral was again clear: "The conditions present certain serious drawbacks. men of exceptional quality and their research. 67 As Cattell recalled, "Mr. Carnegie has specified as one of the main objects of his foundation, to discover the exceptional man in every department of study whenever and wherever found, inside or outside of schools, and enable him to make the work for which he seems specially designed his life work". 68 But how to find exceptional men? How to distribute money among fields? As N.
Reingold documented, "tension spread widely within the communities of American scientists and scholars who might potentially benefit" from the Carnegie Institution. 69 "At present we are conducting a species of Havana Lottery, with monthly drawings, in which the inexperienced and the inexpert man is almost as likely to receive a prize as the expert and the experienced man", commented president R. S. Woodward at a Carnegie Institution trustees' meeting in December 1906. 70 The solutions imagined were many: 71 sending circular letters to scientists in order to get information on their work, setting up advisory committees, constructing a checklist of current research endowments, and…compiling a biographical directory. The latter solution was Cattell's suggestion.
In 1902, at the request of the executive committee of the Carnegie Institution, Cattell started compiling a biographical index of men of science of the United States. 72 He collected a preliminary list of 8,000 names from scientific societies, universities, biographical dictionaries, journal authorships and requests to the readers of journals like
Science. During the summer, he sent to these names a form to be returned, asking for the following information:
-name with title and mailing address,
-department of investigation,
-place and date of birth,
-education and degrees,
-positions,
-honourary degrees and other scientific honours,
-membership in scientific and learned societies, -subjects of research.
After four years of work, instead of four months as originally planned, the directory was published. 73 It was more exclusive than the initial collection of data. This first edition contained about 4,000 biographical sketches of men of science, restricted to those men "who have carried on research work" and "contributed to the advancement of pure science" (natural science). "There is here given for the first time a fairly complete survey of the scientific activity of a country at a given period", stated Cattell. 74 By 1944, the last year Cattell edited the directory before he died, the document contained biographical information on over 34,000 men of science (Table 2) . 
Productivity
Using the directory, Cattell would, in the decades to come, invest the energy he previously devoted to experimental psychology toward measuring the number of scientific men in the country and their conditions. Two concepts were fundamental to his works. The first was "productivity", defined as the number of men of science a nation 77 The last three items were never studied. 78 institutions, culture, and language. But he also produced several descriptive statistics on foreign members by discipline (including social sciences) and epoch, and statistics on the national and social origins of men of science. Above all, de Candolle calculated ratios of men of science to total population in order to compare nations in terms of "productivity".
De Candolle used terms like "répartition" and "proportion" (share) rather than productivity or productiveness, 89 and called his numbers "importance" 90 and "valeur", 91 but the idea of a stock/population ratio and quantitative comparisons between countries was fundamental to his results. He found that small countries, above all Switzerland,
were first in terms of foreign members in scientific societies over the entire period he studied. Boston were identified as the intellectual center of the country. To Cattell, this fact contradicted Galton's thesis: "the inequality in the production of scientific men in different parts of the country seems to be a forcible argument against the view of Dr.
Galton and Professor Pearson that scientific performance is almost exclusively due to heredity. It is unlikely that there are such differences in family stocks as would lead one part of the country to produce a hundred times as many scientific men as other parts (…).
The main factors in producing scientific and other forms of intellectual performance seem to be density of population, wealth, opportunity, institutions and social traditions and 89 He used the term "production" once (p. 163). 90 Number of men of science a country has divided by the total number of men of science. 91 Number of men of science divided by million population. ideals". 93 According to Cattell, "the scientific productivity of the nation can be increased in quantity, though not in quality, almost to the extent that we wish to increase it".
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The distribution of men of science by residence revealed the same concentration. Here, Cattell developed a method for evaluating gains and losses of regions based on comparing numbers for births and numbers for residence: if a state produced 1,000 men of science (birth) but retained only 800 of them (residence), then it had lost 200 to other states (mobility). Cattell's estimates showed that large centers like Massachusetts and New York maintain their position and that Washington and California gain, but that the South "remains in its lamentable condition of scientific stagnation". 95 The position of Washington was used here as an example for "those of us who believe that the future of scientific research depends largely on its support by the nation, the states and the municipalities". 96 Cattell also found concentrations in a few cities: three-fourths of scientific men lived in 39 places. To Cattell, "the lack of men of distinction in whole regions and large cities is a serious indictment of our civilization. The existence of cities such as Brooklyn and Buffalo is an intellectual scandal".
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The second edition of the directory (1910) allowed Cattell to develop statistical comparisons over time. Cattell reiterated the fact that: 98 we are at present almost wantonly ignorant and careless in regard to the conditions which favor or hinder scientific work. We do not know whether progress is in the main due to a large number of faithful workers or to the genius of a few. We do not know to what extent it may be possible to advance science by increasing the number of scientific positions or how far such an increase might be expected to add to the number of men of genius. We do not know to what extent increased salaries, better facilities and greater leisure would favor the quantity and quality of our work. We do not know to what extent non-rational sanctions, such as reputation, offices, titles, degrees, prizes, membership in exclusive societies and the like are effective. We do not know whether it is wise to combine teaching with research or applied 93 The statistical analysis was entirely expressed in an evaluative or moral tone, using terms like gain or loss, success or failure, leadership, deficiency in productivity, progressive centers, and sinister and discreditable records. Cattell measured that the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut showed the greatest gains -nearly one-fourth of new men of science resided in these two states, which have just 5% of the US population -that the western states have about maintained their positions, while the southern states fell still further behind, and big cities were losing to an extent that is "ominous". 99 In general, "the increase in the number of scientific men of standing is only about one-half so large as the increase in the population of the country (...). In no country does there seem to be a group of younger men of genius, ready to fill the places of the great men of the last generation". 100 To Cattell, "eminent men are lacking and this we must attribute to changes in the social environment": 101 the growing complexity of science, educational methods, lack of fellowships and assistantships as well as prizes, teaching load, and low salary. "The salaries and rewards are not adjusted to performance", unlike Germany, Great Britain and France, where the "exceptional men have received exceptional honors (…). Methods should be devised by which scientific work will be rewarded in some direct proportion to its value to society -and this not in the interest of the investigator, but in the interest of society". 102 Cattell's analysis of scientific productivity was solely based on men of science living in on hand that we produce from one seventh to one tenth of the world's scientific research, but that we have not produced one tenth of its recent great discoveries or its contemporary great men (…). It is obvious that we should collect without delay the information that would tell us where we stand among the nations". 103 Cattell waited until 1914 to collect such data, and published the results quite late because of the war (1926). 104 Using the British Who's Who in Science, he calculated that the United States was now in advance of other nations in the number of scientific men. 105 
Performance
Productivity was the first concept Cattell introduced in his statistical analyses. The second was that of "performance". Whereas productivity measured quantity, performance measured quality or merit, defined as "contributions to the advancement of science, primarily by research". Cattell's method relied on evaluation by peers. He occasionally measured these contributions by counting papers, 106 but his main method rested on the evaluation of men of science by judges or peers. As Galton had chosen dictionaries as his source of data because of their objectivity (the "judgments of others"), Cattell believed that "expert judgment is the best, and in the last resort the only, criterion of performance". 107 He asked ten leading representatives of each of the twelve sciences he selected to arrange the men of science in order of merit (rank) (see Appendix). 108 The "positions assigned to each man were averaged, and the average deviations Evaluation of performance by peers, or reputation, was the method Galton relied upon for selecting his population (dictionaries), and Cattell was conscious of the limitations: "it should be distinctly noted that the figures give only what they profess to give, namely, the resultant opinion of ten competent judges. They show the reputation of the men among experts, but not necessarily their ability or performance (...). There is, however, no other criterion of a man's work than the estimation in which it is held by those most competent to judge." 115 To justify the method further, Cattell compared his procedure of votes to that used in elections to a scientific society, or in filling chairs at a university.
His method was said to be superior: "the academy has no method of comparing performance in different sciences". 116 To Cattell, "the methods of selection used in this research are more accurate than those of any academy of sciences, and it might seem that the publication of the list would be as legitimate as that of a list of our most eminent men selected by less adequate methods. But perhaps its very accuracy would give it a certain brutality". 117 In other words, "it would require courage to do this, and perhaps it would not be possible to obtain the arrangement if it were to be made known". 118 With hesitation, Cattell then added a star (with no ranking) to the names of the top thousand men of science in the directory.
In all his statistical analyses, including his numbers on productivity, Cattell retained the top thousand men of science: "These are the thousand students of the natural and exact sciences in the United States whose work is supposed to be the most important", claimed
Cattell. 119 All through his life, Cattell had to explain at length and justify the procedure, because his statistics relied wholly on this selected group of men of science, not on the population at large as indexed in the directory. 120 A few months before Cattell's death The table was only the first ranking Cattell produced.
128 He also constructed a combined index of strength of institutions as follows. He attributed weighted (but arbitrary) values to each group of one hundred men of science and calculated totals for each university.
The method was as follows: "A man in the lower four hundred being the unit, those in the other hundreds were assigned ratings as follows: VII. and VI. = 1.2; V. = 1.4; IV. = 1.6; III. = 1.9; II. = 2.2; I. = 3. The first hundred were subdivided, the lower fifty being assigned 2.5, and the upper twenty-fives, respectively, 3 and 4". 129 The statistics showed that Harvard, Chicago and Columbia led, but Wisconsin, Illinois and Carnegie had the greatest gain as compared to 1906. Cattell then presented a detailed ranking on strength of departments by university (Table 4) . Having computed all these figures, a question immediately occurred to Cattell.
Considering that performance can be measured, is it possible to calculate a man's economic value? Cattell thought it was. He started by comparing the distribution of men of science with several variables and showed that performance was correlated with an institution's size in terms of number of instructors, number of students and extent of facilities. In general, he found "one scientific man of standing for each fifty-three thousand dollars invested in buildings and grounds". Cattell then continued and suggested that "those in the lead are not incomparable with the others", if one takes salary as a proxy: "if a university pays its more distinguished professors three times as much as its younger assistant professors, it estimates the one to be worth three times as much as the other". 130 Cattell indeed found that salaries increase with distinction: they were three times as high in the upper hundred as in the lower third.
Heredity
Cattell would continue analyzing statistics on men of science on this same line up until the 1930s, looking at changes that took place in the distribution of sciences, and in the origins and position of scientific men since the last series of data. 131 Measuring productivity and performance, however, was only the first objective of Cattell's program of research. The other was the old question of heredity and environment, as he called it.
In fact, as Galton's student and as a psychologist, one of Cattell's areas of "interest was in human heredity and eugenics". 132 In 1915-17, he then looked at the families of American men of science. 133 He conducted a survey among the top thousand men of science and analyzed the nationality and race of their parents, their occupation, age of marriage and size of family. He arrived at two results. First, on the social origins of men of science, he reported: "It is here shown that 43% of our leading scientific men have come from the professional classes. We may conclude that more than one half per cent of our men of science come from the one percent of the population most favorably situated to produce them". 134 Was it a matter of natural capacity (heredity), as Galton thought, or opportunity (environment)? Both: "The specific character of performance and degree of success are determined by family position and privilege as well as by physical heredity". 135 Cattell drew the following conclusions:
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The children of scientific men should be numerous and well cared for. But we can do even more to increase the number of productive scientific men by proper selection from the whole community and by giving opportunity to those who are fit (…). While we should welcome and support a eugenic movement tending to limit the birth of feeble-minded and defective children and encouraging the birth of those that are well endowed, it appears that under existing conditions of knowledge, law and sentiment, we can probably accomplish more for science, civilization and racial advance by selecting from the thirty million children of the country those having superior natural ability and character, by training them and giving them opportunity to do the work for which they are fit. We waste the mineral resources of the country and the fertility of the soil, but our most scandalous waste is of our children, most of all of those who might become men and women of performance and of genius (…). We can attribute the inferiority of scientific performance in America as compared with Germany, France and Great Britain to lack of opportunity rather than to lesser racial ability (…). When the conditions become as favorable for other sciences as they have been for astronomy, the United States will assume leadership in scientific productivity.
The second result of the studies on families carried the same political message: "The families from which our scientific men come had on average 4.7 children, and those scientific men who are married and whose families are complete have on average 2.3 children". 137 Echoing Galton, Cattell concluded: "It is obvious that the families are not self-perpetuating (…). If the families of the scientific men should increase at the rate of the general population [which they don't], the thousand leading scientific men would have some 6,000 grandchildren instead of fewer than 2,000. These well-endowed and well-placed people would probably have an average economic worth through their performance of not less than $100,000, and the money loss due to their non-existence is thus $400,000,000". 138 To Cattell, society has obligations with regard to children of professors. He suggested that universities give scholarships to the sons of men of science, and pay a higher salary for the married professor. These were his suggestions for the reproduction of the "species". American origin, no publicly-funded academy nor prizes, no job opportunity for the scientific investigator, no public appreciation of science. 139 "How short-sighted a thing it is", argued Millikan, "for any country to fail to find in some way the funds necessary for carrying on research and development work". In fact, the early 1900s was a time when direct funding of men of science, by way of privately-funded philanthropy, was just beginning; 140 industrial laboratories that could hire or consult men of science were few;
Discussion
141 government support for university research was limited. 142 This was the context out of which efforts for the advancement of science developed. Scientists became activists, organizing themselves (AAAS, Committee for One Hundred, National Research Council), developing a public rhetoric stressing the role of science in social progress, and lobbying for substantial increases in financial support for science.
To Cattell, as scientist, editor of Science and the most active member and significant figure of the AAAS, the advancement of science … and of the scientific profession became his leitmotif. At several times, he explicitly expressed this objective: 144 The writer has on various occasions called attention to the economic conditions which limit scientific research. One of the objects of the present work is to improve these conditions (...). The two most important services for society -the bearing and rearing of children and creation in science and art -are exactly those for which society gives no economic returns, leaving them dependent on instincts which are in danger of atrophy (...). The scientific investigator is usually an amateur. He has wealth or earns his living by some profession, and incidentally does what he can to advance science for love of the work. This has its good side in producing a small group of men who are not subject to purely commercial standards. But (...) the most adequate expression of appreciation is direct payment for the service rendered.
Cattell believed in the benefits of (applied) science to society, although he could not measure them properly: 145 "Those listed in the directory have probably done more for the welfare of the American people than all the business men of New York and all the political leaders in Washington". 146 However, according to him, the conditions under which science was actually conducted were detrimental to socioeconomic progress. This he criticized all through his life, and he explained at length in a paper published in 1922
entitled The Organization of Scientific Men, in which he called on men of science to organize themselves to improve their conditions, as "men who labor with their hands have learned to unite in trade unions". 147 To Cattell, "the entire development of our civilization is due to the applications of science", 148 and "the rewards of science are queerly out of proportion to what science has accomplished for human welfare". 149 But although joy in work "may be the greatest in the creative work of art and science (…), it does not give exemption from the ordinary needs of life; it can scarcely exist if the worker has not the means and the time to do his work in the best way (...). The people and the state must learn to pay for the products of scientific research". 150 To Cattell, "each nation should contribute in proportion to its consumption". 151 He thus joined his voice to the call for 1% of national resources to be devoted to research: "Science would be indefinitely richer if a cent were paid to it each time a match was struck or a pin used.
Full payment would be three fourths of the wealth produced annually by the industrial nations". 152 "Why can not scientific men learn how to retain even one per cent of such [economic wealth resulting from the application of science], which when reinvested in research would again yield high usury to science and to society". and departed from ideas on the hereditary basis for scientific excellence. 161 His thoughts became more nuanced, as he explained in 1914: "We do not know whether the progress of civilization has in the main been due to great men who have directed it, or whether these are essentially by-products and epiphenomena of social and economic forces". 162 Cattell's own conviction was: "What a man can do is prescribed at birth; what he does depends on opportunity". 163 To Cattell, social and economic opportunities were as important as heredity, and this explains why he put stress on the socioeconomic conditions of men of science in his country. Cattell's personal background and experience, as a man of science, is partly responsible for this change of mind.
Cattell's Biography
Cattell owed his interest in statistics partly to his training. As an experimental psychologist, Cattell was well acquainted with measurement, and very early in his career he had occasion to meet and work with Galton in London. Cattell's program on mental testing, however, came to a halt in the early 1900s: he began being criticized for the narrowness of his approach. The tests developed by the French psychologist Alfred Binet came to be preferred to his own. This was his first professional setback. 164 Cattell turned to the cause of the advancement of science by way of editing Science, among others journals, and by collecting statistics.
A second professional setback occurred in 1917: Cattell was dismissed as a professor from Columbia University. 165 This decision was the outcome of years of his criticizing university administrators. To Cattell, the growth of universities had transformed the institutions into bureaucratic machines. "We appear at present to be between the Scylla of presidential autocracy and the Charybdis of faculty and trustees incompetence". 166 To
Cattell, universities had lost their spontaneity and creativity. Dogmatism, formalism, discipline, routine, control, machinery and efficiency were the terms he used to characterize the modern American university. 167 Briefly stated, "the methods of business corporation and the political machine have been somewhat wantonly applied to educational administration". 168 Cattell's public criticisms appeared in a series of three papers published in Science and entitled University Control, among others. 169 His main target was university presidents:
"In the academic jungle the president is my black beast (…). The time of the president is largely occupied with trying to correct or to explain the mistakes he has made". 170 To
Cattell, "that the president should decide which professor shall de discharged and which have his salary advanced, which department or line of work shall be favored or crippled, is the most sinister side of our present system of university administration". 171 173 After 1917, it was the method of votes he used to rank men of science by order of merit that was presented as having useful applications: in industry, for selecting those most deserving promotion (a selection free from favouritism), even for selecting a boss; in university, for the payment of salaries that would no longer depend on the choice of the president, but on a procedure that would be "more conductive to cooperation and goodwill". 174 And there were further uses of statistics. Universities were only one of the two types of institutions Cattell criticized. The other was Academies. As early as 1902, Cattell qualified the national and regional American academies of science as stationary and atrophied in condition: 175 "Membership in an academy as an honor, the presidency as a distinction, foreign members, medals, prizes and the like, seem to me to belong to the childhood of science (…). We need a center in each community for organization and social intercourse. As capitalists unite in corporations and laborers in trade unions, so men of science should unite in their academies". 176 To Cattell, this "center" was the AAAS, the organization to which he contributed over all his life. 177 His statistical work reflected these ideas. He preferred consulting peers and drawing statistics from their rankings in order to assess contributions to science or performance: measuring merit was more objective than elections to an honourary institution with "modest functions". And he suggested that statistical rankings should be used as a substitute for votes in scientific societies, as the directory already was, according to him, in official bodies "in connection with appointments, awards, the acceptance for publication of manuscripts and the like".
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Conclusion
Cattell launched a whole field of study, scientometrics, a specialty concerned with measuring science in a systematic way. He did so with a unique tool that occupied him (and his son Jaques). As editor of the journal Science, but also as a member of committees and boards of several scientific organizations, among them the executive committee of the AAAS, Cattell had been a valuable advocate for the scientific community for almost fifty years. But it was statistics, he hoped, that would contribute to the enlightenment of the public. He devoted enormous energies to counting men of science and drawing comparisons in order to measure scientific "productivity": nations, states, cities and universities that produced more men of science were encouraged to continue to do so; those that produced less were invited to increase their productivity. 179 189 It also offered scientists a powerful tool to lobby for funds.
Shortly, the scientific community and its organizations would develop a discourse on shortages of scientists, and government organizations on gaps with the USSR in scientific manpower. The rhetoric was used, with success, to persuade the public and the President to devote increasing sums of money to scientific research, above all basic research. 190 Cattell used two concepts for measuring science. These have remained with us since, and define the current efforts at measuring science: productivity and performance. The concepts measured quantity and quality. Today, counting scientific papers and citations are representatives of the respective concepts. What has changed since Cattell is that counting men of science is no longer the statistics par excellence. Money devoted to R&D is now the preferred statistics. Admittedly, Cattell did produce some financial data.
Using Science as a vehicle, he published several lists of institutional funds (grants) for research starting in 1903, 191 and organized the AAAS Committee of One Hundred concerned with the collection of information on grants for scientific research, whose (quite imperfect and incomplete) lists were published between 1916 and 1918. 192 But this kind of data was sporadic. From the 1920s on, however, interest in organizations, accounting and efficiency replaced interest in great men, and statistics on science started to become institutionalized. 193 After World War II, money devoted to R&D became the most cherished indicator although, according to several experts, statistics on men of science remained the more robust and the most reliable.
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Appendix.
Cattell's Memorandum to Peer Judges of Scientific Merit
The undersigned is making a study of American men of science. The first problem to be considered is the distribution of scientific men among the sciences and in different regions, institutions, etc. including the relative rank of this country as compared with other countries in the different sciences, the relative strength of different universities, etc. It is intended that the study shall be continued beyond the facts of distribution to what may be called the natural history of scientific men.
For these purposes a list of scientific men in each science, arranged approximately in the order of merit, is needed. This can best be secured if those who are most competent to form an opinion will independently make the arrangement. The average of such arrangements will give the most valid order, and the degree of validity will be indicated by the variation or probable error of position for each individual.
It is obvious that such an order can be only approximate, and for the objects in view an approximation is all that is needed. The judgments are possible, because they are as a matter of fact made in elections to a society of limited membership, in filling chairs at a university, etc. By merit is understood contributions to the advancement of science, primarily by research, but teaching, administration, editing, the compilation of text-books, etc., should be considered. The different factors that make a man efficient in advancing science must be roughly balanced. An effort may be made later to disentangle these factors.
In ranking a man in a given science his contributions to that science only should be considered. Thus, an eminent astronomer may also be a mathematician, but in ranking him as a mathematician only his contributions to mathematics should be regarded. In such a case, however, mathematics should be given its widest interpretation. It is more difficult to arrange the order when the work cannot readily be compared, as, for example, systematic zoology and morphology, but, as already stated, it is only expected that the arrangement shall be approximate. The men should be ranked for work actually accomplished, -that is, a man of sixty and a man of forty, having done about the same amount of work, should come near together, though the man of forty has more promise. It may be possible later to calculate a man's value with allowance for age.
In case there is noted the omission of any scientific man from the list who should probably have a place in the first three quarters, a slip may be added in the proper place with his name and address. In case there are names on the list regarding which nothing is known, the slips should be placed together at the end. The slips, as arranged in order, should be tied together and returned to the undersigned.
It is not intended that the lists shall be published, at all events not within ten years. No individual list will be published. They will be destroyed when the averages have been calculated, and the arrangements will be regarded as strictly confidential.
